Africa in 2026: Conflict, elections and a new UK framework

Louisa Brooke-Holland; Philip Loft

The UK’s “new approach” to Africa

In 2024, when shadow foreign secretary, David Lammy argued that UK engagement with Africa needed to do “more than merely offer aid” as states were now “striking bargains and setting their own agendas”.

In December 2025, the government published a seven-point framework on its “new approach to Africa”. Aspects include:

reorientating the UK’s aid relationship from “donor to investor” (in line with its wider policy on aid spending, as this is reduced to 0.3% of gross national income),
collaborating on migration and climate change,
supporting peace and stability,
investing in health,
promoting African voices in global forums like multilateral banks, and
cultural partnerships.

Within parliament, opposition parties and some backbench Labour MPs criticised the framework for not referring to the Commonwealth (which has 21 African states) or setting out how the UK would compete with Chinese and Russian influence in Africa, and its undermining by UK aid cuts.

South Africa hosted the G20 in 2025 but has strained ties with the US

November 2025 summit

In November 2025, South Africa became the first African state to host the G20 meeting of the world’s largest economies. It is also the only African member of the G20.

Among the summit outcomes were South African priorities such as taking action to address debt sustainability for low income states, mobilising more finance to address climate change, and supporting the existing G20 compact for Africa, centred on mobilising private investment.

South Africa-United States tensions

The United States, which holds the G20 presidency in 2026, did not attend the South African summit and has said South Africa will not be invited in 2026.

The announcement follows a significant deterioration in US-South Africa relations in 2025.

This included US criticism of South Africa’s continuing case against Israel under the Genocide Convention at the International Court of Justice, the US applying a high tariff rate of 30% on South African goods entering the US, stopping US aid, offering asylum to White South Africans, and expelling the South African ambassador.

South African President Cyril Ramaphosa has criticised US allegations of mistreatment against White South Africans as “baseless and false” and says there remain “common interests” with the United States. Elements of the South African ruling coalition have suggested, however, the government should do more to repair trade ties.

Economic outlook and aid reductions

Economic growth and inflationary falls

In 2026, the African Development Bank projects that Africa will have the fastest-growing economy of all world regions, at around 4.2% (although from a smaller base). However, new US tariffs, continuing armed conflict, debt servicing costs and need for structural reforms will affect growth.

While inflation is expected to fall across the continent, in 12 countries inflation is projected to remain at 10% and above, furthering cost of living pressures.

Aid cuts will affect Sub-Saharan Africa especially

A further challenge to African states will be a decline in global aid budgets, though some states are expected to benefit from pledges to support the world’s forests made at the climate conference, COP30, in Brazil.

The Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), which reports on the spending of the world’s major aid donors (though not China), estimates that global aid spending fell by 9% in 2024 and projects that falls in Sub-Saharan Africa were greater, at 16% to 28%. Health is one area expected to experience higher reductions.

The OECD notes that foreign aid for African infrastructure has been falling since before the covid-19 pandemic, including that from China.

Some African leaders have suggested that the fall in aid offers an opportunity to increase self-reliance. Analysts have suggested finance opportunities include better free trade integration, local tax mobilisation, exploitation of mineral resources, and addressing debt servicing costs (PDF).

Military intervention in politics has continued

In recent years, several civilian governments have been removed by African militaries.

In 2025, this trend continued, though at a lower level than previous years.

In October, following protests, military officers declared a new government in Madagascar.

Later, in December, there was successful military intervention in Guinea-Bissau, but in the same month an attempt to overthrow Benin’s civilian government failed.

Past coup leaders also consolidated power: in December Mamady Doumbouya, who took power in Guinea in 2021, won his presidential election. Major opponents were unable to stand.

Elections in 2026

Many elections, often involving long-standing leaders, will be held across the continent in 2026. Incumbents are expected to win in many.

Uganda

In January, presidential and parliamentary elections will be held in Uganda. President Yoweri Museveni has held office since 1986. Opposition and civil society groups have reported harassment and detention in the run-up to the contest. The UK is conducting local election observation.

Republic of the Congo

In March, presidential elections will take place in the Republic of the Congo. Denis Sassou Nguesso, president since 1997 (and earlier from 1979 to 1992), is seeking re-election.

Ethiopia

Ethiopia will hold a general election in June, the first since 2021 when many parts of the country had been unable to vote due to conflict and insecurity. Fighting in the Tigray region had ended with an agreement in 2022, though some insecurity remains and there are some risks of conflict (see below).

Since the end of the country’s civil war in 1991, the Prosperity Party and its predecessor parties have dominated Ethiopian leadership.

Libya

Libya, since the overthrow of Muammar Gaddafi in 2011, has been divided by rival political factions.

Under the country’s UN political roadmap, some local elections were held in 2025.

In 2026, parliamentary elections are planned, and the UN Special Representative for Libya argues the “complications […] are challenging […] [but] can be overcome”.

Somalia

Somalia is also expected to hold elections in 2026, though disputes over changing its indirect electoral system had threatened to delay the vote.

However, there remain security challenges. Proscribed terrorist group and Al-Qaeda affiliate, Al-Shabaab, continues to carry out attacks and controls some rural areas.

Other polls

Elections are also expected in Benin, Cape Verde, Cameroon, Algeria, Zambia, Morocco, the Gambia and South Sudan.

Conflict in Sudan and risk in South Sudan

Sudan conflict

The Sudan conflict, which began in 2023, continues.

The UN-backed Integrated Food Security Classification projects two areas of Sudan are in famine conditions and 21 million people (45% of the population) are experiencing acute levels of food insecurity.

In January 2025, the outgoing Biden administration had described the actions of the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) in Sudan as “genocide”. The group denied this and said the US statement would complicate US mediation on the conflict.

Under the Trump administration, the Quad for Sudan—the US, Egypt, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE)— have announced a roadmap to end the conflict, though there remain diverging approaches among them on how to resolve it.

Fighting has continued and the RSF gained control of new regions in late 2025.

South Sudan

In April 2025, the head of the UN Mission to South Sudan warned that the country was “teetering on the edge of a relapse into civil war”, given the rise in ethnic tensions, displacement and attacks on civilians.

The warning followed the arrest of the vice president, who had taken office in 2018 as part of a peace deal and formation of a national unity government.

In December 2025, the UK said that the country’s government must “urgently reverse course”.

Tensions in the Horn of Africa

Israeli recognition of Somaliland

In December 2025, Israel became the first country to recognise the self-declared Republic of Somaliland as an independent state.

Somaliland declared independence from Somalia in 1991, a move not recognised elsewhere.

The Israeli decision was criticised by the African Union and Somalian government. There are regional divisions however, and Ethiopia and the UAE, who have military agreements with Somaliland, have not publicly commented on the Israeli move.

Analysts suggest that the Israeli action may reflect a desire to extend its influence in the Red Sea region, where it has been in conflict with the Houthis in Yemen in 2023 to 2025, as well as countering the influence of other regional powers.

The UK said that any changes must be mutually agreed between leaders in Somaliland and Somalia.

Al-Shabaab continues to pose a threat in Somalia. The African Union Support and Stabilisation Mission in Somalia helps combat the group, with local forces intended to take sole responsibility from 2029. US troops remain in Somalia, but there have been suggestions of a policy review (the first Trump administration having withdrawn troops before being restored under Biden).

Ethiopia-Eritrea tensions in the Horn of Africa

In the Horn, there has also been increased tension between Ethiopia and Eritrea. Eritrea was part of Ethiopia until 1993, and the two fought an intensive conflict from 1998 to 2000.

Ethiopia has long sought direct access to the Red Sea. In 2025, its leaders suggested it would achieve this by force. Ethiopia has also accused Eritrea of backing armed groups within the country.

However, no military mobilisations were reported in 2025.

Islamic State/Daesh and al-Qaeda

While originating in the Middle East, Islamic State has increasingly focused its actions in Africa, where the Armed Conflict and Location Event (ACLED) monitoring group estimates two-thirds of its attacks were carried out in the first half of 2025.

In December 2025, the US carried out air strikes against groups linked to Islamic State in northern Nigeria, citing their attacks on Christians (Islamic State affiliates have targeted both Christian and Muslim groups in the country).

At the request of individual states, since 2022 France has drawn-down its military missions in West Africa. However, in a break to this pattern, in December Nigeria requested French security support. It also provided support in Benin.

Russian paramilitaries and mercenaries have assumed some security roles but their effectiveness has been variable, including in Mali where al-Qaeda groups have imposed a partial blockade on the capital since September 2025. Military ineffectiveness by Russian groups represents a risk to the country’s influence in the region.