Israel and the Abraham Accords in 2025: Five years on

International Affairs And Defence Section

September 2025 marks five years since the Abraham Accords were signed between Israel and four Arab states (Morocco, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Bahrain and Sudan). Due to internal instability, Sudan has not ratified the Accords.

The four states were the first Arab states to establish public ties with Israel since Egypt in 1979 and Jordan in 1994.

Since their signing, economic and some defence ties between Israel and the Abraham Accords states have deepened. However, the 2023–25 Israel–Hamas conflict has led to challenges.

This Insight provides an overview of the Accords, the current state of relations between Israel and Arab states and the outlook for the future.

What are the Abraham Accords, and how did they initially develop?

In 2020, Israel, Bahrain, the UAE, Morocco and Sudan signed agreements to establish full diplomatic relations and set out plans to advance economic, security, and other ties.

The agreements built on ties with Israel that were developing in the 2010s. These ties were often motivated by a shared concern about Iran’s regional influence and nuclear programme, as well as a desire to solidify ties with the US, which brokered the Accords.

Israeli leaders and the US administration also set out expectations that the Accords would be expanded to other states, contributing to the Middle East peace process.

The UK Government welcomed the Abraham Accords in 2020, but stressed “there is no substitute for direct talks between the Palestinians and Israel”.

The Palestinian Authority criticised the Accords for their lack of focus on a two-state solution to the conflict, though the UAE said the Accords were about “preventing annexation” of the occupied West Bank by Israel.

In 2022, two years after the Accords were signed, Israel concluded a free trade agreement with the UAE. This was Israel’s first trade agreement with an Arab state. The UAE is now the second-largest trading partner for Israel in the region, behind Turkey. A similar deal between Israel and Bahrain has not yet been agreed, though talks were initiated in 2022. Israel and Morocco have a more limited trade agreement.

Security ties also developed. These included:

What is the state of Arab-Israeli relations in 2025?

Continuing diplomatic ties

While polling of Arab public opinion in the 2023–25 Israel–Hamas conflict has found a widespread decline in support for establishing formal ties with Israel, none of the Abraham Accord states have cut ties with Israel.

The UAE President, Sheikh Mohammed bin Zayed Al Nahyan, was the first Arab leader to speak to Prime Minister Netanyahu after the Hamas assault of 7 October 2023 and, despite opposition from Bahrain’s parliament and protests in Morocco, diplomatic engagement between Arab states and Israel continues.

Challenges

However, there have been challenges.

Al Aqsa Mosque/Temple Mount

Arab states condemned the Israeli cabinet minister Itamar Ben-Gvir’s attempts from 2023 to challenge what are known as the “status quo” arrangements at Al Aqsa Mosque/Temple Mount in Jerusalem (Ben-Gvir’s latest visit being in August 2025). Currently, only Muslims are allowed to pray at the site.

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has said there will be no change to the prayer arrangements.

Reported plans to annex the West Bank

There has been Arab criticism, notably from the UAE, of reported Israeli plans to consider annexation of the occupied West Bank in 2025. In August, the UAE said that annexation of the West Bank would be a “red line” and that “there can be no lasting peace” if there is annexation. Saudi Arabia has reportedly issued similar warnings.

In September, President Trump said that he will not allow annexation.

Israeli strike on Qatar

In response to the Israeli strike targeting Hamas leaders in Doha, Qatar, in September 2025, the Arab League and the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (a collection of Arab states and states with significant Muslim populations) have called on all governments to “prevent Israel from continuing its actions against the Palestinian people” and “review [their] diplomatic and economic relations with it”.

Israeli–Egyptian relations

There are also strains in longer-standing relationships. Throughout the 2023–25 conflict, Egypt has opposed potential Palestinian displacement from Gaza and is reportedly concerned Israel may target Hamas members in Egypt.

In September 2025, the Egyptian President, Abdel Fattah al-Sisi, referred to Israel as the “enemy”, the first time he has done so since coming to power in 2014. He told the summit of Arab and Muslim states that Israeli actions had “place[d] obstacles in the way of […] new peace agreements” and warned they were “even aborting the existing peace agreements”.

Following its strike on Doha, the Israeli Government has not ruled out strikes against Hamas leaders elsewhere. Hamas members are based in Egypt and Qatar to facilitate talks on ending the 2023–25 conflict. All 15 members of the UN Security Council, including the US, have “condemned” the Doha strike.

Will other Arab states join the Accords?

Saudi Arabia and Arab Gulf states

Both the Biden and Trump administrations have sought to expand the Abraham Accords, notably to include Saudi Arabia. Reports suggest that one of Hamas’s objectives in its 7 October assault was to end Israeli/US negotiations with Saudi Arabia.

Saudi Arabia has said recognition of Israel is conditional on the establishment of a Palestinian state, with East Jerusalem as its capital. Past Saudi conditions have also reportedly included a defence pact with the United States and cooperation on civil nuclear programmes.

During the 2023–25 conflict, Israeli Prime Minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, has suggested an “Abraham Alliance” against Iran, building on the defensive role played by Jordan, Saudi Arabia and the UAE in the Israel–Iran conflict of April 2024.

However, analysts have suggested that the Arab Gulf states may deepen their own defence cooperation after the Israeli strike on Doha, rather than relying on external partners (such as the US). Increased intelligence cooperation and joint training exercises are expected.

Arab states are also strengthening other ties. Analysts note that, since 2023, Saudi Arabia has shifted towards engaging with Iran, in an attempt to maintain regional stability (with this rapprochement brokered by China, not the US). In 2025, Saudi Arabia also signed a mutual defence agreement with Pakistan.

The UAE and Saudi Arabia were also among the states to repair their ties with Qatar in 2021, having boycotted the state since 2017, and in 2025 may choose to advance their ties with the new governments in Lebanon and Syria.

Lebanon and Syria

In 2025, both the Trump administration and the Israeli Government have suggested that Lebanon or Syria under the post-Assad government may wish to join the Abraham Accords.

Lebanese leaders have rejected normalisation while Israeli forces remain at five sites in southern Lebanon and continue to target armed groups.

While a security agreement may be reached between Israel and Syria, Israeli occupation of the Golan Heights and strikes are cited as barriers to normalisation.

What has the UK Government said?

The UK Government backs an expansion of the Accords, and has committed under its 2030 roadmap with Israel to help advance them.

However, in June 2025 the then Foreign Secretary, David Lammy, argued that there are “no prospects” of the Accords being expanded until an agreement is reached between Israel and Hamas. In September 2025, the UK’s Middle East Minister, Hamish Falconer, acknowledged that Abraham Accords states had been “signalling disquiet” at Israeli actions prior to the strike on Doha.