The attack on the Nord Stream pipelines in September 2022 highlighted the vulnerability of undersea infrastructure, such as cables carrying internet services and energy pipelines, to malicious attack. NATO says Russia is “actively mapping” critical infrastructure on the seabed.

The Ministry of Defence has accelerated the procurement of a new ship specifically to detect threats to the seabed and cables. RFA Proteus is expected to begin operating in summer 2023.

This Insight discusses threats to the UK’s undersea critical national infrastructure and how the UK and allies are responding.

Why are undersea cables and pipelines important?

Undersea cables and pipelines form part of the UK’s critical national infrastructure, the facilities, systems and networks necessary for a country to work.

On the seabed lie miles of telecommunication cables that enable internet access, financial transactions and the sharing of data essential to business and personal life. Estimates vary, but the Ministry of Defence suggests 99% of global internet traffic goes through undersea cables.

Seabed gas and oil pipelines provide essential energy supplies to the UK; 77% of all of the UK’s gas imports came from Norway through pipelines lying under the North Sea.

The Ministry of Defence says the growing use of the seabed has “increased opportunities for adversaries to threaten Western subsea critical national infrastructure”.

What is seabed warfare?

Seabed warfare broadly refers to undersea warfare in which the seabed is the focus.

Undersea warfare is not new; submarines have long played a vital role in the Royal Navy’s history, while the Royal Navy has for decades maintained mine-countermeasure vessels in the Persian Gulf to destroy unexploded sea mines from the Iran-Iraq war.

What is new, or at least becoming more widely discussed in public, is the growing threat to critical infrastructure on the seabed and the resulting risk to national security.

What threatens undersea cables and pipelines?

The sabotage of the Nord Stream pipelines in the Baltic Sea in September 2022 highlighted the potential vulnerability of undersea cables and pipelines to malicious attack.

While most damage to undersea cables is caused by fishing or shipping activities, such as the damage to undersea cables that cut communication services to the Shetland Islands in autumn 2022, the European Parliament has warned of the “potential for sabotaging undersea cables during times of conflict” (PDF).

Advances in underwater technology, including autonomous and remotely piloted devices, mean seabed exploration has become more accessible.

This means that seabed warfare is “no longer a distant concept” but “represents an immediate and legitimate threat”, according to a NATO Parliamentary Assembly committee draft report.

The threat from Russia

The UK Government said in a defence report in 2021 that Russia is developing “deep sea capabilities which can threaten undersea cables”.

The Chief of the Defence Staff, Admiral Sir Tony Radakin, says there has been a “phenomenal increase in Russian submarine and underwater activity” over the last 20 years.

The French Government says Russia has been “upscaling in the field of seabed warfare” (PDF) and is “very active” in everything related to underwater combat.

In May 2023 a senior NATO official said Russia is “actively mapping” gas pipelines and internet cables.

How is the UK military responding?

One of the Royal Navy’s tasks is to protect undersea critical national infrastructure (PDF).

The Royal Navy already operates Astute-class submarines, capable of detecting underwater activity and mine-counter measure vessels, which operate sub-surface systems. RAF maritime patrol aircraft can track surface and sub-surface vessels.

A new ship to defend undersea cables and pipelines

In 2021 the Ministry of Defence announced plans to develop a new multi-role ocean surveillance capability (MROS) to safeguard critical national infrastructure.

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022 prompted Defence Secretary Ben Wallace to accelerate the procurement of the first of these new ships.

RFA Proteus is expected to enter service in summer 2023. It is a converted merchant ship capable of operating remote and autonomous underwater systems. It will be operated by the Royal Fleet Auxiliary, which is the civilian branch of the Royal Navy, supported by Royal Navy specialists.

Plans for a second ship are at the concept phase.

Crewless submarines

The Royal Navy ordered its first crewless submarine in December 2022 and is developing autonomous vehicles to detect sea mines with France.

The UK will also collaborate in developing undersea capabilities with Australia and the United States as part of the 2021 AUKUS agreement.

New agreement with Norway

On 18 May 2023 the UK and Norway agreed to develop a strategic partnership “to counter shared threats in the undersea domain” including threats to undersea infrastructure. Norway has already stepped up surveillance in the North Sea in response to undersea threats.

What are NATO and other countries doing?

Dr Lee Willett, writing in Jane’s Intelligence Review, says many navies are focusing on seabed warfare as a “rapidly emerging area of operational and capability development.”

In early 2022, France announced it is developing a seabed warfare strategy (PDF), noting that the “seabed is turning into an area of conflict”.

In February 2023, NATO set up a Critical Undersea Infrastructure Coordination Cell at its headquarters to “boost the security of Allied undersea infrastructure.”

The European Parliament examined the vulnerabilities of undersea cables and infrastructure and the potential consequences for EU members in a report in 2022. In March 2023, the European Commission updated its Maritime Security Strategy, pledging to promote the development of capabilities for securing critical seabed infrastructure by 2024.Do not type over or delete this non-printing text


About the author: Louisa Brooke-Holland is a researcher at the House of Commons Library specialising in defence.

Photo by Joel Fulgencio on Unsplash


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