Yemen 2026: Southern Transitional Council’s fall and renewed Houthi-Saudi conflict
In 2026, the Southern Transitional Council collapsed in the south, Houthi-Saudi/Yemen government fighting resumed, and humanitarian need is high.
The UN Interim Force in Lebanon’s mandate will end in 2026 and it will withdraw in 2027. The force has been in place since 1978. What are the plans post-UNIFIL?
In August 2025, the UN Security Council (UNSC) voted unanimously not to renew the mandate of the UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) after 2026. Its troops will complete a draw-down in 2027. The force, which is responsible for monitoring armed activity along the “Blue Line” between Israel and Lebanon (among other responsibilities) has been in place since 1978.
The UNSC vote followed the Israel-Hezbollah conflict of 2023/24. This has been followed by a further conflict in 2026. Hezbollah is a non-state armed group proscribed by the UK Government as a terrorist organisation.
This page sets out the planned end to UNIFIL from 2026, regional reaction and expectations, and debates on the potential successor to the force.
While a framework agreement between the Lebanese, Israeli and US governments has been in place since June 2026, some fighting in Lebanon continues. The framework, which Hezbollah has rejected, intends for Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon and Hezbollah disarmament.
Progress on the framework has been limited, and it does not specify a role for the UN or UNIFIL.
See the separate Library briefing on the conflict for details on the talks in 2026.
In 2026, the Lebanese Government has said its first preference is a reversal of the Security Council’s decision on UNIFIL, or, failing this, a new international force. Some European states, notably France and Italy, have said they would be prepared to contribute to this new force. The UN Secretary General has also published three options for a UN force to succeed UNIFIL.
Any UN mandate for a new force will require the support of the UNSC.
Israel and the United States have said UNIFIL has been ineffective in its mission and failed to contain Hezbollah. However, UNIFIL says it is only responsible for “assisting” the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) and Israel Defense Forces (IDF) under its UNSC mandate. In 2026, Israel has also opposed a new international force or a replacement UN force.
The UK Government says it will fully participate in talks on UNIFIL, and in 2025 warned against the “premature” withdrawal of the force.
The Commons Library’s Lebanon: Introductory country profile, March 2025, provides background and further reading on Lebanon. The Library has also published a separate briefing on the 2025 plans to disarm Hezbollah.
The force was established in 1978 by the UN Security Council to monitor the “blue line” between Israel and Lebanon (see below map), confirm the withdrawal of Israeli forces, and help the Lebanese Army and Government assert control in southern areas.
The UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) has been in place since 1978, established under UN Security Council Resolutions 425 and 426 (both 1978). Its mandate was expanded in 2006. The force seeks to maintain Lebanon’s territorial integrity and sovereignty.
Following the 2006 Israel-Hezbollah conflict, and the passage of UNSC resolution 1701 (2006), UNIFIL was tasked, together with the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF), with:
Under its peacekeeping mandate, UNIFIL is not responsible for disarming Hezbollah or ensuring the exit of Israeli forces.
Its mandate had been renewed annually by the UN Security Council.
Further background can be found on UNIFIL’s background page and FAQs.
Under UNSC resolution 1701 (2006), UNIFIL has a maximum strength of 15,000 personnel. As of August 2026, it has around 7,500 troops, from 45 countries. Two personnel are from the UK.
Between its creation in 1978 and June 2026, 346 UNIFIL personnel have been killed; this is the highest of any UN peacekeeping mission.
Italy, Indonesia, India and Spain currently provide the largest contingents to the force, with around 700 to 800 troops each.
The current head of the UNIFIL mission is Major General Diodato Abagnara, from Italy. The chief of staff is French Major General Marc Galan.

Source: Council on Foreign Relations, Lebanon: How Israel, Hezbollah, and regional powers are shaping its future, January 2025. CC BY-NC-ND 4.0. Note there is no agreed land border between Lebanon and Israel.
In August 2025, the UN Security Council voted to renew UNIFIL’s mission for a final time, until December 2026. The decision was made unanimously.
UN Security Council Resolution 2790 (2025) (PDF) says that:
Withdrawal of most uniformed UNIFIL personnel is expected to be completed by mid-2027. As it withdraws, UNIFIL positions will be handed to the LAF. However, UNIFIL’s head of mission has said the handing over of some sites may be “very difficult”, as around half of UNIFIL’s sites are in Israeli-controlled territory (as of September 2026).
A smaller UN mission, the UN Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO), will remain after UNIFIL’s withdrawal. UNTSO monitors compliance with the 1949 Armistice Agreement between Israel and Lebanon.
The resolution also calls on other countries to support the LAF, for the LAF to continue to cooperate with UNIFIL, and for Israeli forces to withdraw their remaining forces north of the Blue Line and for the LAF to deploy there.
Both the Israeli and US Governments have been critical of UNIFIL, arguing it has taken insufficient action to prevent Hezbollah’s military build-up.
Media reports in 2025 suggested that no other Security Council member other than the United States had intended an end to UNIFIL, with France, who drafted the compromise resolution that passed, warning against premature withdrawal.
The United States has said the force was only ever intended to be “interim”. It has said the 2023-24 Israel-Hezbollah conflict, that of 2026, and the US-Lebanon-Israel trilateral framework from June 2026 (see below) has meant the security environment has changed sufficiently as to no longer require UNIFIL.
Under the second Trump administration, the US has also been seeking to reduce its contributions to UN peacekeeping missions, including to UNIFIL. It made no request to congress for UNIFIL funding in 2026 (PDF).
In response to the Israel-Hezbollah conflict in 2026, trilateral discussions between the governments of the United States, Israel and Lebanon have begun. These are centred on disarming Hezbollah, Israeli withdrawal and extension of LAF territorial presence in Lebanon. They do not include a role for UNIFIL or successor UN presence.
Hezbollah rejects the talks and has previously warned of civil war if the LAF attempts to disarm it.
Under the 2024 agreement between Lebanon and Israel (PDF), there is also a US-chaired ceasefire monitoring mechanism.
Israel backed the 2025 vote in the UN Security Council (PDF) and reiterated its support again for the resolution in 2026.
In August 2026, Danny Donon, Israel’s ambassador to the UN, said that “we oppose the deployment of new international forces in the area” and were opposed to the three options presented by the UN Secretary General in June. He said these UN missions “could provide Hezbollah with a platform to rebuild its strength” in southern Lebanon.
In August 2025, Israel had told the UN Security Council (PDF) that UNIFIL had “failed in its mandate” and “completely failed to prevent Hezbollah’s ongoing military build-up within its area of operations”.
Earlier resolutions on UNIFIL have been amended in attempts to strengthen its ability to act independently of the LAF, though this has sometimes drawn Lebanese criticism.
UNIFIL has also faced criticism for not countering Israel’s presence in Lebanon: at the Security Council debate in 2025 Algeria (then a UNSC member) said that UNIFIL had not fulfilled its mandate (PDF) as “Lebanese lands remain under Israeli occupation”. There have also been reported tensions with local communities in Lebanon, some of which have been associated with Hezbollah.
No final decision has been made on what force, if any, will replace UNIFIL. In June 2026, the UN Secretary General presented three options, as required under the 2025 resolution. European states have also proposed a multinational mission. China and Russia have backed an UN-mandated force.
In June 2026 the UN Secretary General, Antonio Guterres, informed members of the Security Council of three options, each involving a UN uniformed presence. They would all be smaller than the current UNIFIL mission.
UNSC resolution 1701 (2006) would remain the overarching framework for any mission.
The Secretary General said the UN presence would help “facilitate de-escalation, dialogue [and] liaison” and “perform the fundamental task of supporting full respect for the Blue Line by the parties”.
A focus on monitoring and coordination in the proposed missions also reflects what the UN Under-Secretary General Peacekeeping has described as “the decisions of the Lebanese authorities to actively involve themselves in […] implementing resolution 1701” since 2025, including in the LAF gaining a monopoly on all weapons in the country.
The three options presented by the Secretary General are:
Security Council members are under no obligation to accept any of the UN Secretary General’s proposals.
As with all UN Security Council resolutions, such as to establish a new force or to renew UNIFIL’s mandate, any decision will be open to a veto by any one of the council’s five permanent members (China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom and the United States).
Any new UN-mandated force must be endorsed by a UNSC resolution. This can set out the scope of any mission and the basis on which it can act. As state above, UNSC resolution 1701 (2006) would remain in place and act as the overarching framework for any mission.
In May 2026, China’s ambassador to the UN, Fu Cong, said that “we do believe we should revisit the decision actually to withdraw the UNIFIL”, given the Israel-Hezbollah conflict of 2026. He told the Security Council in June that it must “ensure the continuation of the United Nations presence in Lebanon and to prevent a security vacuum” (PDF).
Also in 2026, Russia has said it “deem[s] it necessary to maintain a meaningful United Nations presence along the Blue Line” (PDF).
The governments of France and Italy, both of whom are major troop-contributing countries to UNIFIL, have suggested there could be a multinational mission.
In June 2026, Italy and France announced a coalition to support Lebanon. French President, Emmanuel Macron, said he wanted to see the “clearest possible mandate, the most effective mission and the broadest possible participation” in a future international force. Italian Prime Minister, Giorgia Meloni, said the measure was necessary to avoid a security vacuum.
Italy currently leads the Military Technical Committee for Lebanon, an international body coordinating multinational military assistance to the LAF.
Both leaders acknowledged that the force will need an international legal framework to operate.
France had previously said in 2025 that premature UNIFIL withdrawal “could undermine or even weaken the efforts of the Lebanese Government” in the south.
The German Foreign Minister has also suggested an EU-mandated force.
The EU does not intend the force to fully replace UNIFIL. In September 2026, the EU’s High Representative for Foreign Affairs, Kaja Kallas, said its aims would be to support the LAF and Lebanese Government. She said that ten EU member states were willing to contribute troops or resources.
As mentioned above, Israel has said it opposes a multinational force and cut off ties with the EU High Representative in 2026, citing other tensions.
Turkey has also said it is willing to support a post-UNIFIL mission.
In 2025, speaking before the UNSC vote, the UN’s Under-Secretary General for Peace Operations, Jean-Pierre Lacroix, acknowledged “challenges” for UNIFIL but argued that it can “only succeed in its work if Lebanon and Israel honour their commitments in good faith”.
He has also noted that under UNSC resolution 1701 (2006), UNIFIL’s role is to assist Israel and Lebanon in implementing its provisions and it was “never mandated to disarm Hezbollah”.
UNIFIL’s current head of mission, Major General Diodato Abagnara of Italy, has said in 2026 that the UN presence in southern Lebanon is “very, very essential […] now, more than ever”. The Italian government has said the mission “has a successful model based on respect for the local culture, impartiality, credibility and closeness to the civilian population”.
UNIFIL had said in August 2025, before the UNSC vote, that “right now, the Lebanese army don’t have the capacities and capabilities to be fully deployed”.
The Lebanese Government’s “first option” remains renewing UNIFIL.
In 2025, the Lebanese Government welcomed the renewal of UNIFIL’s mandate into 2026 (PDF) and said that it would cooperate with it during the draw-down period.
However, it warned that it “considers UNIFIL’s presence as essential to guaranteeing security and stability in Lebanon” until UNSC resolution 1701 (2006) is implemented. It also noted continuing Israeli military action in Lebanon and said that the Security Council “must […] prevent Israel from violating Lebanese sovereignty”.
Support for UNIFIL has extensive support in the Lebanese Parliament, where in 2026 two-thirds of lawmakers have petitioned the UN Security Council for an extension.
In both 2025 and 2026, Lebanon has requested a one-year extension to UNIFIL’s mandate, as in the past (PDF).
Speaking in August 2026, the Lebanese President, Joseph Aoun, said his “first option” remains renewing UNIFIL’s mandate, and if this could not be achieved, then the “presence of international forces in the South” under a legal framework with the LAF (such as that proposed by France and Italy).
Hezbollah did not issue a response to the UNSC vote in 2025.
The UK backed the 2025 UN Security Council resolution, though warned against a “premature” withdrawal. It plans to participate in talks in 2026.
In December 2024, the UK Government had described UNIFIL as playing an “essential role in maintaining peace along the Blue Line”. It has reiterated its support during the Israel-Hezbollah conflict in 2026 and condemned attacks on the mission.
The UK supported the resolution in August 2025. It said it did so as it allows UNIFIL “to operate for 16 months before an orderly withdrawal” but regretted that its withdrawal would occur before the complete implementation of UNSC resolution 1701 (2006).
The UK’s deputy representative to the UN Security Council, James Kariuki, also said that premature withdrawal “risk[s] fostering a security environment that Hezbollah can exploit” and “comes in the context of continued Israeli presence” in southern Lebanon. The UK called on Israel to withdraw its forces.
In June 2026, in response to a question whether it would support renewing UNIFIL’s mandate, the UK Government said “we will play our full part to try to ensure that it [UNIFIL] can contribute as much as possible”. It said it was having ongoing discussions with allies and at the UN on the issue.
Foreign Policy analysts have published a range of assessments on UNIFIL. While noting much of UNIFIL’s ability to function is dependent on the cooperation others, some have argued it has taken insufficient steps to help contain Hezbollah. Others have said it could continue to play an important monitoring/verification role.
Analysis for the Middle East Institute argues that UNIFIL has historically been “unwilling to absorb the costs that came with confronting Hezbollah”, that more personnel from NATO member states should be attached to it, and that its mandate should have included references to “clearing weapons caches, destroying tunnels, and other such activities that go beyond monitoring”.
The Washington Institute similarly argues that “UNIFIL remains a generally ineffective entity” and has not sufficiently confronted Hezbollah. It instead suggests that resources and international support should be transferred to the LAF and it given phased levels of support as it establishes control over Lebanese territory.
Analysis for International Crisis Group argues that UNIFIL is “imperfect” and may have “historically downplayed” Hezbollah’s infractions of UN resolutions to avoid confrontation. However, it argues it is best-placed to identify unauthorised military assets and to monitor LAF action to remove them.
In its 2026 analysis, the International Crisis Group argued that “much” will now depend on the trilateral US-Israel-Lebanon talks and the implementation of the security arrangement they reached in June 2026. It says if a new mission is established, it will “have no choice but to work alongside” the trilateral arrangement and could potentially play a role in verifying if Hezbollah disarms, as the framework envisages.
Campaign and monitoring group Human Rights Watch have argued UNIFIL’s departure should be delayed as it would “abandon millions of Lebanese civilians to an uncertain and potentially disastrous fate”.
Analysis for the Italian Institute for International Political Studies says “UNIFIL can only perform its duties if and when the conflicting parties allow it to do so”, noting attacks by Israel and Hezbollah and affiliated groups.
Foreign Policy magazine analysis also notes that the LAF has not been deployed in large numbers alongside UNIFIL to support the disarming of Hezbollah and the patrolling of southern Lebanon.
In 2026, the Southern Transitional Council collapsed in the south, Houthi-Saudi/Yemen government fighting resumed, and humanitarian need is high.
Israel-Hezbollah fighting continued into June. Issues in talks include disarming Hezbollah and both Israel and Hezbollah withdrawing from southern Lebanon.
In 2026 Iraq selected a new president and prime minister. Issues facing Iraq include disarming or integrating Iran-backed militias into the state armed forces.