Yemen 2026: Southern Transitional Council’s fall and renewed Houthi-Saudi conflict

Since 2015, control of Yemen has been divided: the Houthis, backed by Iran, control the north and an internationally recognised government, now known as the Presidential Leadership Council (PLC), controls the south.

The main Houthi-PLC frontlines had been largely frozen since a 2022 ceasefire. However, there was a rapid reordering of PLC forces in the south from December 2025 to January 2026. Since mid-2026, the Houthi-Saudi conflict has also been renewed, and the Houthis have captured new areas from the PLC on the Red Sea coast, posing a threat to freedom of navigation.

This briefing provides an overview of the conflict’s origins and primary actors, the changing balance of power within PLC areas in early 2026, the growing conflict from mid-2026, and the challenges of delivering aid in Houthi areas.

What are the origins of the conflict in Yemen?

The immediate origins of the conflict lie in the Arab Spring of 2011, discontent with the rule of Ali Abdullah Saleh, who had ruled unified Yemen since its creation (it had previously been divided into separate states), and a series of failed transitions (including failed talks on federalisation, regional autonomy and sharing resources and power).

Saleh stood down in 2012, and was replaced by his deputy, Abdu Mansour Hadi. The armed conflict is generally held to begin in 2014, when the Houthi group (in alliance with Saleh) captured the capital Sana’a. The conflict was internationalised with the entry of a Saudi-led coalition in 2015, in support of Hadi. The Houthis later broke off their alliance with Saleh, and he was killed in 2017. Hadi ceded power to the PLC in 2022.

Although different parties control the north and south, the conflict does not centre on attempts to divide Yemen into two separate states, as existed before 1990 (the Houthis in the north are not seeking a separate state).

Who are the main actors in Yemen?

There is a range of armed and political groups in Yemen:

• The Houthis (Ansar Allah): a Zaydi Muslim movement, led by the Houthi family. Based in the north, it holds Sana’a and controls the majority of Yemen’s population. Iran provided little support during the Houthi’s conflicts with Saleh from 2004 and 2010, but it has subsequently given increasing aid. The group is subject to a UN arms embargo.
• Presidential Leadership Council (PLC): the internationally recognised government of Yemen, replacing Hadi in 2022. An eight-member body, formed of Saudi or United Arab Emirates (UAE)-backed figures. It included the Southern Transitional Council until 2026 (see below). Analysts have viewed the PLC as fractured, hindering its effectiveness.
• Southern Transitional Council (STC): a separatist group founded in 2017 and which had been able to capture most of non-Houthi Yemen in early 2026. It soon lost its territory and was removed from the PLC. It has since relaunched as the “Transitional Council of South Arabia” and continues to hold protests in Yemen. It had been backed by the UAE.
• Islah party, the Yemeni Congregation for Reform: the major Sunni political movement in Yemen. The UAE view the party as too close to the Muslim Brotherhood, a link it denies. Saudi Arabia backs its politicians.

The three most important external actors are Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Iran:

• Saudi Arabia led a military coalition in support of Hadi from 2015. The coalition has now split and Saudi Arabia has increasingly disengaged militarily from the conflict. It continues to support the PLC.
• UAE was part of the Saudi-led military coalition but withdrew most of its forces in 2020 and the remainder in January 2026 following the failed STC action. It had supported the STC and other armed groups.
• Iran has provided rhetorical and, over time, increased military support for the Houthis, as part of its regional alliance network.

The US and UK supported the Saudi coalition from 2015. The UK is penholder for Yemen at the UN Security Council, meaning it takes the lead on council work. Mediation is organised by the UN’s special envoy.

What are the major developments in 2026?

There have been three major developments that have created greater instability: the rise and fall of the STC, the regional fallout from the Israel/US-Iran conflict, and intensification of Houthi-Saudi/PLC tensions and conflict.

Rapid rise and fall of the Southern Transitional Council’s territorial control

Since a national six-month long ceasefire in 2022, frontlines in the conflict have been stable and intensive Houthi–PLC/STC fighting did not restart.

However, since 2022 the STC had continued to expand control within PLC areas and in December 2025 said it had entered and taken control of several south-eastern provinces. The STC said it would focus on consolidating its control and an independence referendum by 2028.

In January 2026 a counter-offensive by the PLC resulted in a rapid reversal of control. This offensive, backed by Saudi Arabia, culminated in the removal of STC ministers from the PLC and the group’s apparent dissolution (some members disputed this and the group has now been renamed). 

UAE–Saudi tensions and UK and US response to the STC

In response to the STC offensive, UK and US ambassadors to Yemen reiterated their support for a negotiated settlement, the territorial unity of Yemen, and the role of the PLC. Both the US and UK called for a return to dialogue.

The events strained relations between the two leading Arab Gulf states, the UAE and Saudi Arabia, which backed opposing sides within the PLC. Both called for restraint. In January the UAE announced it would withdraw its remaining forces. Analysts judge, however, it is unlikely to fully disengage.

Renewed Houthi-PLC/Saudi conflict from mid-2026

In June 2026 the Houthis announced a “new phase” in the conflict with Saudi Arabia, centred on lifting the blockade against their air and sea ports.

Tensions and violence have grown, with the Houthis announcing a sea and air blockade on Saudi Arabia and conducting drone and missile attacks against sites in Saudi Arabia, the first since 2023. In turn, Saudi Arabia has launched a maritime coalition and conducted air strikes, the first since 2022. The Houthis have since been able to capture several Red Sea coastal areas. Control over the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, carrying about 7% of global oil, is now disputed.

In September the UK announced “defensive” support to Saudi Arabia in the form of a one RAF voyager air-to-air refuelling aircraft. From October, RAF Typhoon fighter jets will also fly defensive counter air missions across Saudi Arabia but will not participate in offensive action against the Houthis. This support is additional to the UK’s earlier deployment of air defences in 2026.

Houthis restrict and hinder aid groups in the north

The Houthis in the north have also continued to restrict the operation of aid groups, and detained staff from several aid agencies, including those of the UN. As a result, the UN has relocated its main offices to Aden. The UN Security Council, including the UK, has jointly called for their release.

Yemen peace talks have not progressed

The UN special envoy and Oman have continued to mediate. A major planned prisoner swap for July stalled due to the increased tensions. The UN special envoy has previously proposed a roadmap for the country. This would include a temporary ceasefire before a wider negotiated settlement.

Update log

31 March 2026: Updated with STC losses in the south (section 2) and added a note on Houthi participation in the Israel/US-Iran conflict of 2026.

October 2026: Updated material on Houthi-Saudi/PLC fighting, and response of the UK, Pakistan and Turkey.