The impact of foreign interference on security, trade and democracy

What is “foreign interference”?

In 2017, the then Australian Prime Minister Malcolm Turnbull described foreign interference as influence that is “covert, coercive or corrupt”, crossing the “line that separates legitimate influence from unacceptable interference”.

Similarly, the Home Office in a 2022 factsheet on foreign influence drew a contrast between open and covert state activity. It suggested the UK conducts one model of “open and transparent influence activities, such as using diplomacy to shape and align policy to benefit shared interests”, whereas other states seek “to further their strategic interests by going beyond overt political influence”. It also said that some of these other states “use covert and malign political interference activities to undermine our interests, such as using disinformation to manipulate our political debate or weaken the integrity of our democratic institutions”.

What “foreign interference” is active in the UK?

In May 2024, Parliament’s Joint Committee on the National Security Strategy said in a letter to then Prime Minister Rishi Sunak that “in recent years, the UK has experienced a pattern of attempted foreign interference from countries such as China, Russia, Iran and North Korea”.

In June 2025, the government published a Strategic Defence Review, which said “the UK is already under daily attack, with aggressive acts—from espionage to cyber-attack and information manipulation—causing harm to society and the economy”.

The review called Russia “an immediate and pressing threat” and said it would continue to pose “an enduring threat in key areas”, which include cyberspace and information operations.

The review labelled China as a “sophisticated and persistent challenge”, saying it is “likely to continue seeking advantage through espionage and cyber-attacks, and through securing cutting-edge Intellectual Property through legitimate and illegitimate means”.

It also named Iran a “regional disruptor”, saying it continued “to pose a direct threat to the UK in cyberspace”.

What steps has the government taken?

This briefing focuses on recent legislation and government initiatives to oppose foreign interference, relevant select committee inquiries, and the threats posed by China, Iran and Russia.

The government’s June 2025 National Security Strategy said “the openness of our democracy and economy are national strengths. Therefore, it is vital to keep ahead of those who seek to exploit them with robust defences”. The strategy said the government is “taking steps to make our country a harder operating environment for hostile actors”.

Actions by the UK Government to combat foreign interference over the last several years include:

• Passing the Counter-Terrorism and Border Security Act 2019, which introduced powers to stop, question, search and detain people entering and exiting the UK to determine whether they have been engaged in hostile state activity.
• passing the National Security and Investment Act 2021, which introduced new powers for the government to investigate and intervene in company mergers, acquisitions and other deals that could threaten the UK’s national security
• setting up a Defending Democracy Taskforce in 2022 to “protect the democratic integrity of the UK from threats of foreign interference”
• passing the Elections Act 2022 with measures aimed at tightening the rules around preventing foreign money influencing UK elections
• passing the National Security Act 2023, which introduced new offences in relation to foreign interference and gave the government powers to introduce a Foreign Influence Registration Scheme (FIRS), as well as enhancing existing prohibitions on foreign finance and influence affecting UK elections and party finance
• in January 2022 and November 2025, MI5 issuing interference alerts to warn MPs, peers, and parliamentary staff of alleged Chinese agent’s attempts to infiltrate Parliament and to recruit people with access to sensitive information about the British state
• passing the Procurement Act 2023, which introduced enhanced powers for related public bodies to exclude certain suppliers from procurement on national security grounds and to terminate contracts where necessary
• commissioning the Independent Reviewer of State Threat Legislation to conduct a review, published in May 2025, of what parts of the UK’s counter-terrorism framework could be applied to modern-day state threats
• commissioning a review in May 2025, by the Defending Democracy Taskforce into the government’s responseto transnational repression in the UK
• bringing FIRS into force in July 2025, and placing Iran and Russia and key organisation from those countries on the “enhanced tier” of the scheme, making it an offence for anyone to carry out any activity (outside a narrowly scoped group of exempted activities) in the UK at their direction without it being registered
• introducing the Cyber Security and Resilience (Network and Information Systems) Bill in November 2025, which would require organisations in critical sectors to further protect their IT systems
• publishing a policy paper in July 2025 with proposals to tighten the rules on political donations