Syria in 2026: How are the UK and others engaging?

Emma Cabezaolias; Philip Loft

Following the fall of President Assad in 2024 and the end of Syria’s 13-year civil war, an interim government has been established in Syria. This is led by Ahmed al-Sharaa, leader of one of the major rebel forces, Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), previously designated by the UK and others as a terrorist group.

Since Assad’s fall, the UK, US and European Union have been among those to increase their engagement with the interim authorities. Among the actions they have taken are:

lifting sanctions on the Syrian economy and governing institutions
removing the terrorist designation against Sharaa and HTS
Expanding diplomatic ties.

However, they have also criticised ongoing violence in Syria, including against minority groups, which reports suggest in 2025 included some members of the interim government forces.

This briefing describes how global and regional powers have been engaging with the new authorities in Syria and are seeking to shape its future. It focuses on the actions of five states:

United Kingdom
United States
Russia
Israel
Turkey

For wider information on Syria after Assad’s fall, see the Library collection Syria in 2026.

How did international rivalries shape Syria’s civil war?

While the Syrian civil war’s origins lay in domestic discontent as part of the wider Arab Spring, foreign influence in Syria played an important role in shaping the civil war and explaining its longevity.

The Library timeline on the Syrian civil war provides an overview of the 2011 to 2024 period.

Iran and Russia were Assad’s major allies

During the civil war, both Iran and Russia intervened militarily in support of Assad, while Turkey supported rebel groups in northern Syria. Direct American and European military action was limited, following domestic political opposition to intervention, but they contributed to the territorial defeat of Islamic State/Daesh between 2014 and 2017.

Due to diverging international attitudes towards Assad, the UN Security Council was often paralyzed during the conflict, with China and Russia opposed to resolutions targeting the Assad regime.

While a UN political process aimed to end the civil war, talks between Iran, Turkey, and Russia instead became the dominant channel, under what was termed the Astana process.

Iran’s influence in Syria has now been weakened substantially with the fall of Assad, while Russia is now only one of several actors.

How has the UK approach changed from 2025?

The UK Government has engaged diplomatically with the interim government, and removed the terrorist designation against HTS. It has also lifted many of its sanctions, though retained those against Assad-era regime figures.

UK opposition to Assad, 2011 to 2024

At the start of the Syrian civil war in 2011, the UK called on Assad to step down. The UK withdrew its diplomatic staff from Syria in 2012 and the embassy closed in 2013. As a member of the EU, the UK imposed a range of sanctions against the Assad regime.

As set out in section 3 of the Library briefing, The Syrian civil war: timeline, UK aid and statistics, in 2013 the House of Commons voted against military action against Assad. It backed action against Islamic State/Daesh in Syria from 2015.

The UK continued to support a UN-led peace process, but like other European states its influence was increasingly limited to sanctions and humanitarian aid. Assad’s foreign military backers, Iran and Russia, became the dominant actors, as well as Turkey for some opposition groups.

Like the US and EU, UK opposition was also unable to halt Assad’s rehabilitation in the Middle East, which culminated in his re-entry to the Arab League in 2023 (the League being a collection of Arab states).

UK diplomatic engagement and status of embassy

In December 2024, the UK Government cautiously welcomed the declaration of the interim authorities, but then Prime Minister Sir Keir Starmer warned that “we must not make the mistake of thinking that what comes next [in Syria] is necessarily going to be different and better”.

In the 18 months since, the UK has deepened its engagement with the interim government. UK ministers have visited Syria, and formal diplomatic ties have been re-established. While the UK does not have an embassy in Syria, the Syrian embassy to the UK was reopened in November 2025. In 2026, the UK Government has said it is reviewing whether to open an embassy, and is “keen” to reestablish one in Syria.

In September 2026, when giving evidence to the Commons Foreign Affairs Committee, the government’s former Syria envoy Jon Wilks argued that a UK embassy in Syria would allow the UK to “build the relationships that will deliver the results”.

UK Government says it “wants this new Syria to succeed”

Writing in December 2025 to mark one year since Assad’s fall, then Middle East Minister Hamish Falconer said that while challenges remain, “the UK wants this new Syria to succeed”:

There remain significant challenges ahead for Syria […] the enduring ISIS [Islamic State] threat […] [and] outbreaks of sectarian violence across Syria have deepened divisions.

A stable and flourishing Syria with investment and business opportunities is in all our interests. So too is an inclusive Syria that recognises the voices and needs of all citizens and a Syria that contributes to regional and global security.

Al-Sharaa’s visit to the UK, March 2026

In March 2026, interim Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa visited the UK, meeting the Prime Minister and King Charles III. Among the issues he discussed with the UK Government were counterterrorism, human rights and migration, and the importance of inclusion and transitional justice for peace and stability within Syria.

Both the UK Government and MPs have visited Syria since Assad’s fall, with then Foreign Secretary David Lammy visiting the country in July 2025. This was the first visit by a UK minister to Syria since 2011.

In July 2026, the first cross-party group of MPs visited Syria since the fall of Assad. The visit focused on economic and investment opportunities.

Reducing UK sanctions

In April 2025 the UK Government announced it would amend its Syrian sanctions regime. Sanctions against Assad figures would remain, but wider economic sanctions were to be lifted to support reconstruction and Syria’s re-integration into the global economy.

During the Commons debate on the amendments in May 2025, Minister Stephen Doughty said that the retained measures will be “used as a responsive tool, targeting those who bear responsibility for repression and human rights abuses”, including in post-Assad Syria.

The UK action was in parallel to similar moves by the EU and US.

In April 2026, the UK government further amended its sanctions to remove trade restrictions on luxury goods, gold, precious metals, and diamonds. The EU lifted certain economic sanctions on Syria the same month. The UK Government said the action would “support Syria’s economy and allow UK business to contribute to and benefit from the country’s economic recovery”.

Removing terrorist designation of HTS

In October 2025 the UK also removed the terrorist designation from Hayat al-Tahrir (HTS) group, saying it was no longer an alias of Al-Qaeda. It said the action would “enhance our ability” to “step up our engagement and support”.

In 2025, the then Shadow Foreign Secretary, Dame Priti Patel, had called for the UK to apply more conditions to the relief of sanctions, citing sectarian violence in 2025, and said the decision on HTS “should have only been done if there was overwhelming evidence”.

New UK sanctions in response to 2025 violence

In December 2025, six individuals and three organisations were sanctioned in response to their involvement in the coastal violence earlier in 2025 and Assad-era violations. Other sanctions against Assad-era figures remain in place.

Statements on specific aspects of the transition

The UK Government has called for an inclusive and Syria-led transition and been critical of sectarian violence. For more on these issues and the UK response, see the separate Library briefings on Syria’s minorities and forming an interim government, published in September 2026.

What are the US priorities?

Since the fall of Assad, US engagement has shifted from supporting the (now dissolved) Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces during the civil war to supporting the interim government. The Trump administration has removed several long-standing economic restrictions on Syria.

US backing for the interim government

In November 2025, during a visit of interim President Sharaa to the United States, President Donald Trump said that his administration would “do everything we can to make Syria successful”. In 2026, the US President said that Syria’s interim government had been “doing a very good job of cleaning up their act” and has a “very good leader” in Al-Sharaa.

Like the UK, the United States has progressively removed its sanctions (see below) and de-listed HTS as a terrorist organisation in two steps in 2025 and 2026.

In May 2025, Secretary of State Marco Rubio argued that while HTS has a “tough history”, “if Syria is unstable, the region is unstable”. He said that there was a risk of renewed civil war if authority cannot be established in Syria and regional states cannot invest in Syria, because of US sanctions.

Syria has been allowed to reopen its embassy in Washington DC. The US has cited security threats (not from the interim authorities) as a reason why the US embassy in Syria had not reopened.

Five US requests of Sharaa since 2025

US policy has been centred on five requests made of Sharaa in May 2025:

1 Sign onto the Abraham Accords with Israel.

2 Tell all foreign terrorists to leave Syria.

3 Deport Palestinian terrorists.

4 Help the United States to prevent the resurgence of ISIS [Islamic State].

5 Assume responsibility for ISIS detention centres in northeast Syria.

Analysis for the Washington Institute thinktank in November 2025 noted that Syria had made progress on points 3 and 4 (Syria joined the global coalition against Islamic State in November 2025 and has conducted a joint military operation with the US), but only some progress on point 2, and none on the remainder.

Since publication of the assessment, there has been some progress in 2026: the interim government has now assumed control of detention centres in northwest Syria from the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) (many of the detainees are now in Iraq). However, as set out in 2026 by analysis from the thinktank, the International Crisis Group, many foreign fighters remain in Syria’s armed forces.

Changing US approach towards Kurdish-led forces

During the civil war, the US backed the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) as a group to combat and contain Islamic State/Daesh. However, following the decision of the interim Syrian government to join the global coalition against Islamic State in 2025 and the withdrawal of the SDF from many parts of northeastern Syria in January 2026, US Presidential Envoy to Syria Tom Barrack said:

the original purpose of the SDF as the primary anti-ISIS force on the ground has largely expired, as Damascus [referring to the interim Syrian authority] is now both willing and positioned to take over security responsibilities.

The SDF announced its dissolution in August 2026 and integration into the interim Syrian state—see the Commons Library briefing, Syria in 2026: Interim government and Kurdish integration. This was welcomed by the US.

Lifting of “Caesar sanctions” on Syria

During the later stages of the Syrian civil war, Arab Gulf states had called for the removal of sanctions, citing them as a block on investment and trade with Syria.

Among these sanctions were the Caesar sanctions, which came into effect in 2020. Under this legislation, third countries and companies could be sanctioned by the United States if they engaged with Syrian authorities.

In December 2025, US legislation permanently removed these sanctions. Under the 2025 Act, the US President must regularly inform Congress of Syrian progress on issues such as protecting the rights of minorities.

Removing Syria’s designation as a “state sponsor of terrorism”

In August 2026, the US lifted many of its remaining sanctions on Syria when it removed Syria from its list of “state sponsors of terrorism”.

Syria has been listed a state sponsor since 1979. Restrictions under the designation include limits on US foreign assistance, a ban on defence exports, and controls over some dual-use items (referring to goods that have both a military and civilian purpose).

Secretary of State Marco Rubio said that the decision was “taken in recognition of the positive actions taken and further commitments” by Al-Sharaa to “fully distance Syria from acts of international terrorism”. The interim Syrian government said it would enable Syria’s “integration into the global economic and financial system”.

US forces have ended their 10-year deployment in Syria

Over 2025 and 2026, the US has been withdrawing troops from neighbouring Iraq, with a deadline for completion of the end of September 2026. A new security partnership is planned.

During Syria’s civil war, US forces were based in northeast Syria to combat Islamic State/Daesh. While there was a planned draw-down in 2025 for Syria, this was paused due to concerns for stability.

However, this process resumed in 2026 and in April the US completed the draw-down of the final 1,000 troops in Syria as part of an “accelerated transition” (PDF). The departure of US troops followed the transfer of around 5,700 accused Islamic State fighters from detention facilities in northeast Syria to Iraqi prisons.

The interim Syrian Government said it would now assume control of counter-terrorism efforts. The US action follows remarks in January 2026 from the US envoy for Syria, Tom Barrak, who said that “the US has no interest in long-term military presence” in Syria. The US says it will continue to take action to combat Islamic State/Daesh.

What is the status of Russian bases?

Russia was a long-standing ally of Assad. Negotiations since Assad’s fall have centred on retaining its military bases.

Russia as Assad’s ally

was a long-standing ally of Assad, intervening militarily in support of his regime in 2015, in a move then widely seen as turning the conflict in Assad’s favour. Syria gained additional strategic importance for Russia with the establishment of a naval and air base on the Mediterranean.

Following the collapse of the Assad regime, Russia granted Assad and members of his family asylum on humanitarian grounds.

Significance of Russia’s military bases in Syria

Since Assad’s fall in 2024, Russia was in talks with the interim Syrian government regarding a “possible reformatting” of its military bases in the country.

The two primary sites of Russian activity in Syria have been the Russian-operated Tartus naval base and Hmeimim air base. In addition to Assad enabling a Russian presence in the region, analysts have noted these bases have been important in facilitating Russia’s projection of power in Africa.

Interim President Sharaa has visited Russia twice (in 2025 and 2026), and suggested he would honour past agreements between the two countries. However, in 2025 his foreign minister had also suggested that some issues, including bases, would remain under discussion.

Agreement reached to transition control of bases

In August 2026, the interim Syrian Government said it had reached a final agreement with Russia over the bases.

Under the agreement, Syria will assume responsibility for the management of civilian facilities at the sites (such as the commercial port) while military sites will be converted into training centres over the next three months. Some Russian troops are expected to remain.

The International Crisis Group notes that Russia is likely to remain an important partner for the Syrian interim government, being a source of oil and significant weapons supplier (Russian weaponry having long been integrated into the Syrian armed forces).

What is the future of Israel-Syria ties?

The US has expressed hopes that Israel and Syrian’s interim government may establish diplomatic ties (there has never been formal diplomatic recognition between the two states). However, tensions remain over the status of Israeli-occupied Golan Heights and Druze communities in southern Syria.

Military action since 2025 and Israeli objectives

While Israel welcomed the fall of Assad as part of a wider weakening of Iran’s “axis of resistance” (including Hezbollah in Lebanon and Hamas in Gaza), from December 2024 it has launched hundreds of airstrikes and some ground incursions in the country to destroy Assad-era weaponry, maintain a demilitarised buffer zone, and to protect Syria’s Druze minority.

Analysts argue Israel is seeking a decentralised and weak neighbour to remove any threat to Israel, it being sceptical of the new Syrian leadership.

Challenges to reaching a new security agreement

Syria, like many Arab states, lacks a peace agreement with Israel after the Arab-Israeli conflicts of 1948 to 1973.

While the US has expressed hope that Israel and Syria will establish diplomatic relations (the two came close in the 1990s) or a security pact, the interim Syrian authorities have said there will be no security agreement with Israel until it withdraws from the occupied Golan Heights.

Israel has reiterated its demand for a buffer zone and retaining the Heights.

For more on the status of the Heights, see 3.4 of the Library briefing on Syria after Assad, updated in July 2025.

Limited security agreement, January 2026

In January 2026 a more limited agreement to establish a dedicated communication cell was reached. Through the cell, interim Syrian authorities and Israel will “facilitate immediate and ongoing coordination on their intelligence sharing, military de-escalation, diplomatic engagement, and commercial opportunities”, under US supervision.

The agreement followed a statement by President Trump in December 2025 that “Israel [must] maintain a strong and true dialogue with Syria” and that “nothing” should “interfere with Syria’s evolution into a prosperous state”. The statement followed Israeli military action near the Golan Heights in November 2025.

Israeli military activity has continued in 2026

While a limited security agreement was reached in January 2026, Israeli military action in parts of southwest Syria have continued. This included action that Israel said was in defence of the minority Druze group in southern Syria (see the Library briefing on Syria’s minorities) and around the occupied Golan Heights.

Israel has said it will remain in what it describes as a “buffer zone” in southern Syria “as long as Israel faces jihadist threats”.

In 2026, Israel-Syria talks have been largely frozen since the US/Israel-Iran conflict began in February. In August 2026 the interim Syrian Foreign Minister said that while he remained was open to talks, “we do not trust Israel currently”.

What has the UK Government said on Israel-Syria ties?

In 2026, the UK Government has called on Israel to:

resume talks with the interim Syrian Government
set out a timeline for its withdrawal from areas in southern Syria

The government has also reiterated its position that it “recognise[s] the Golan Heights as Israeli-occupied Syrian territory” and warned that “violations of the 1974 Disengagement of Forces Agreement risks further destabilisation” (for the 1974 agreement, see 3.4 of the Library briefing on Syria after Assad, updated in July 2025).

How is Turkey shaping Syria?

During the Syrian civil war, Turkey provided military support to one of the major opposition groups to Assad. Since Assad’s fall, it has opposed Kurdish autonomy in northeast Syria.

Turkey backed rebel groups

Analysts widely described Turkey as a major winner from the Syrian civil war, though it primarily backed the Syrian National Army (SNA), and not HTS, which it had designated a terrorist group.

Since the fall of Assad, Turkey has offered security support to the interim authorities as well economic investment. In 2026, it says it will continue to support the training of interim government forces, citing the threat from Israel (see above).

In 2025, the SNA agreed to integrate with the central forces of the interim government, led by HTS.

Returning Syrian refugees from Turkey

In addition to supporting Syrian stability, Turkish priorities are arranging the return of Syrian refugees from the country (which totalled 3.7 million at their peak) and supporting a centralised Syrian state.

According to the UN Refugee Agency, around 668,000 refugees have returned to Syria from Turkey between December 2024 and May 2026. Around 2.3 million refugees remain in Turkey. UK aid is continuing to support the Turkish response.

Turkish opposition to Kurdish autonomy

Turkey has been opposed to the Kurdish-led autonomous area in north-east Syria and its separate army, the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), elements of which it says were tied to terrorist activity by the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) in Turkey. Media reports suggest Turkey was willing to take military action in 2025 to ensure this.

In 2025, Turkey had reached a ceasefire agreement with the PKK and the group is now disarming under Turkish laws passed in August 2026.

Turkey since reiterated its demand that Kurdish forces in Syria integrate into a single Syrian armed force. While this process had stalled in 2025, following further fighting between the SDF and interim government forces in 2026, the SDF has announced it will integrate into a single Syrian armed force. The Turkish Government welcomed the SDF decision.

The Library briefing, Syria in 2026: Interim government and Kurdish integration, has information on the Kurdish northeast and integration.

Turkey-Israel tensions in 2026

Recent years have seen greater tensions between Israel and Turkey, including over Hamas in Gaza and Israeli military conduct in the Strip, and shifting regional alignments following the weakening of Iranian influence since 2023.

As noted by the European Council on Foreign Relations, Syria has become a “flashpoint” between Israel and Turkey, with both pursuing competing aims in the country (Turkey seeking a centralised Syria, Israel a Syria with areas of greater autonomy).

In August 2026 Israel accused Turkey of being on the “verge of breaching” an agreed status quo by deploying troops at an airbase near Aleppo and launched strikes on the base. No casualties were reported.

Turkey denied it was seeking to establish a base at the site. The US special envoy to Syria described the Israeli attack as an “unnecessary escalation”. Turkey accused Israel of seeking to undermine the political transition in Syria.