What does the Taliban’s victory mean for the Middle East?

In August 2021, the Taliban captured Kabul as coalition troops withdrew from Afghanistan. They are now in control of the country.

This Insight addresses four questions that this raises for Afghanistan’s neighbours:

1. How should they interact with the Taliban?
2. How dependable is the US as an ally?
3. Whether Afghanistan will become more attractive for potential terrorists.
4. Whether the region will experience a refugee crisis.

Countries face difficult decisions on how to interact with the Taliban

Afghanistan’s neighbours—shown on the map below —have an interest in ensuring Afghan terror groups (such as Islamic State) are contained, and the country retains a functioning economy to stem a potential humanitarian crisis.

From 1996 to 2001, when the Taliban last controlled Afghanistan, only three countries recognised their government: Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE).

Now, with the Taliban facing criticism for human rights violations, its neighbours will be equally hesitant to be associated with their regime.

Of Middle Eastern states, Qatar is now the closest to the Taliban regime, having hosted its diplomats since 2013. However, it has strong relations with the US and brokered its talks with the Taliban.

Iran faces challenges. It welcomed the coalition withdrawal and shares a common enemy in Islamic State. However, as a Shia-Muslim majority country it is also concerned about Afghanistan’s Shia minorities who have historically been persecuted by the Sunni-majority Taliban.

No state has yet offered the Taliban recognition, but many plan to interact with the group to bring stability. In December 2021, the 57 foreign ministers of the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (an international group of Muslim states) pledged only humanitarian support to help stabilise Afghanistan.

The Gulf is likely to assert greater autonomy from the US

The US primarily has a strong security relationship with the Gulf states (such as Kuwait, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the UAE). Since taking office in January 2021, President Biden has sought to disengage from long-running Middle Eastern conflicts. He has, for example, withdrawn US support for the Saudi-led offensive in Yemen. The Administration instead hopes to focus on challenging Chinese influence as part of its pivot to Asia.

Under the Trump Administration, regional powers were already seeking to reduce their dependence on the US. This reflected Trump’s 2020 decisions to scale down US troops in Iraq and Afghanistan, and the withdrawal of US forces from areas of Syria following a Turkish offensive in 2019.

Under Trump, some Arab states reacted to US disengagement by strengthening ties with Israel (in the case of Bahrain and the UAE) or reaching out to usually hostile powers (such as between Saudi Arabia and Iran).

Despite intentions to reduce its presence, US reliance on the Gulf is likely to grow. This is to support its “over the horizon” counter-terrorism operations in Afghanistan (such as drone strikes) and to mediate US diplomatic contact with the Taliban.

However, the US will increasingly be only one of several powers influencing regional events: Gulf countries have already diversified their security cooperation in the region to include Russia, and have been reaching out to the Russian-backed Assad regime in Syria, against US wishes.

Afghanistan may harbour more terrorists

The Taliban has close ties with terrorist groups, including Al-Qaeda. Both the US-led coalition and Afghanistan’s neighbours fear the country will attract terrorists.

The UN Security Council has urged the Taliban to adhere to the counter-terrorism commitments it agreed as part of the Doha peace agreement.

The Taliban faces violent internal opposition from Islamic State Khorasan Province (IS-K), the regional affiliate of the Islamic State (IS) group. IS is now much weaker in the Middle East compared to its peak in 2014, when it controlled around 25% of Syria and 13% of Iraq.

However, the Taliban has made little progress against IS-K. In November 2021 the UN warned the Taliban seemed unable to stem its growth, with the group likely present in every Afghan province. It reported IS-K attacks were also 5.5 times higher in 2021 compared to 2020: 334 versus 60.

If the Taliban attempts to contain IS-K militarily, it’s likely to result in significantly increased violence across Afghanistan.

In October 2021, the US estimated that IS-K may be capable of mounting an international attack within a year.

Refugee numbers may increase

Prior to the Taliban’s victory, the Middle East already hosted around a quarter of the world’s 84 million forcibly displaced people, according to the UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR):

• Of the 2.6 million UNHCR-registered Afghan refugees, Iran hosted 780,000 (30%), second only to Pakistan, which hosted 1.4 million (54%).
• Iran also hosts an additional 3 million undocumented Afghans, according to its government.
• Of the 226,000 UNHCR-registered Afghan asylum seekers globally, 125,000 (55%) are hosted by Turkey.

All three countries face difficulties as hosts, with both Iran and Pakistan recovering from recessions, and Turkey additionally hosting 3.6 million Syrian refugees.

The UNHCR has warned that economic collapse in Afghanistan, due to the fall in foreign aid, international trade, and freezing of Afghan banking assets abroad, may lead to an “implosion that will cause an inflow of people” both those moving within and beyond Afghanistan’s borders.

So far this has been avoided and most displaced people have remained within Afghanistan.

Afghanistan’s economic prospects for 2022, however, seem poor. The UN projects 79% to 97% of the Afghan population may fall into poverty this year. In January, the UN launched its largest-ever aid appeal for a single country, calling for US$ 5 billion to meet basic humanitarian needs.

Further reading

• Afghanistan: Refugees and displaced people in 2021, House of Commons Library
• Friends, enemies, neighbours? The Taliban and the Middle East, August 2021, DW
• What does IS-K’s resurgence mean for Afghanistan and beyond?, US Institute of Peace, September 2021

About the author: Philip Loft is a House of Commons Library researcher on international affairs.

Photo: Kabul by Mohammad Husaini on Unsplash